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Abstract—With non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA), we
tackle the maximization of the secrecy rate for the strong user
subject to a maximum allowable secrecy outage probability,
while guaranteeing a constraint on the transmission rate to
the weak user. For the first time, the dependence between
the eavesdropper’s ability to conduct successive interference
cancellation and her channel quality is considered. We determine
the optimal power allocation and the redundancy rate, based on
which the cost of security in terms of the reduction in the strong
user’s secrecy rate is examined and the benefits of NOMA for
secure transmissions are explicitly revealed.
Index Terms—Non-orthogonal multiple access, physical layer
security, power allocation, redundancy rate.
I. INTRODUCTION
Non-orthogonal multiple access (NOMA), which can sig-
nificantly boost spectral efficiency, is envisaged as a poten-
tially promising technique for the fifth-generation (5G) and
beyond wireless communication networks [1], [2]. Different
from the conventional orthogonal multiple access (OMA),
NOMA efficiently exploits power domain multiplexing at a
transmitter and successive interference cancellation (SIC) at
a receiver to serve multiple users in the same resource block
(e.g., time/frequency/code domain). Specifically, these users
are normally divided into two types [3], [4], i.e., the strong
users and the weak users, where the strong users require a
high date rate, e.g., to support live sports streaming, while the
weak users may only require a predetermined low data rate,
e.g., to support text messaging.
Meanwhile, physical layer security (PLS), as a comple-
mentary and alternative technique to the traditional crypto-
graphic methods, can defend against eavesdroppers (Eves)
by exploiting the property (e.g., randomness) of the wireless
medium [5]–[7]. Naturally, PLS can be applied to NOMA
communication networks in order to achieve the ever-lasting
and information-theoretic security [8]–[12]. For example, the
authors of [8]–[10] examined PLS of the wireless NOMA net-
work with perfect knowledge of Eves’ channel state informa-
tion (CSI), which indicated a significant secrecy performance
improvement achieved by NOMA relative to OMA. In addi-
tion, the authors of [11], [12] considered a practical scenario
where the transmitter does not know Eve’s instantaneous CSI,
where PLS of both the strong and weak users were studied.
In a NOMA system, the transmitted signals to a weak user
should be decoded by the strong user in order to enable SIC
at the strong user. This leads to the fact that the achieved
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security of the weak user is conditioned on the assumption that
the strong user will not release any information transmitted
to the weak user. If there is no trustiness between the weak
and strong users, the information-theoretic security of weak
user’s information is hard to be guaranteed in NOMA systems.
Against this background, in this work we propose a new
framework to examine PLS in a NOMA communication sys-
tem by considering a passive eavesdropping scenario without
Eve’s instantaneous CSI. This framework aims to maximize
the secrecy rate for the strong user subject to a maximum
allowable secrecy outage probability (SOP) while guaranteeing
a specific requirement on the transmission rate to the weak
user. One specific applicable scenario of our new framework
is where the strong user desires a high data rate with security
requirement to support a tele-medical treatment, while the
weak user only needs a non-secure broadcast service.
Adopting this new framework, we determine the exactly and
asymptotically optimal power allocation between the strong
and weak users and the optimal redundancy rate for the strong
user, based on which the cost of the considered security
for the strong user is explicitly examined in terms of the
reduction in the secrecy rate to the strong user. Our analysis
indicates that the asymptotic results accurately approach to the
corresponding exact results in the high main-to-eavesdropper
ratio (MER) regime. In addition, our analysis reveals that
the cost of the considered security decreases and the optimal
power allocation becomes less sensitive to the maximum
allowable SOP as the transmission rate requirement to the
weak user increases. Furthermore, our analysis demonstrates
that the equal power allocation is asymptotically optimal and
the redundancy rate approaches one as the transmit power
increases to infinity.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Considered Scenario and Adopted Assumptions
We consider a NOMA communication scenario, where a
transmitter is serving two legitimate receivers in the presence
of an Eve. We assume that each of the transceivers is equipped
with a single antenna. The channel gains from the transmitter
to the legitimate receivers and Eve are denoted hk, k ∈ {1, 2}
and he, respectively, which are the Rayleigh fading gains with
independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) entries with zero
mean and variance δ2k and δ
2
e respectively. We assume that CSI
of all the legitimate channels is known at the transmitter, while
only the statistical CSI of Eve’s channel is available. Without
loss of generality, we also assume that the legitimate channel
gains are sorted in ascending order [8], [12], i.e., 0<|h1|2≤
|h2|2.
Employing the NOMA scheme, the transmitter sends two
information signals s1 and s2 to user 1 and user 2, respectively,
where the transmit power is denoted by P . We denote φk
2(0 < φk ≤ 1) as the fraction of the transmit power allocated
to user k and then the transmitted superposition signal can be
expressed as
∑2
k=1
√
φksk, where
∑2
k=1 φk = 1. In this work,
we consider PLS only for the transmission to user 2 (i.e., the
strong user with a higher channel gain). This is due to the fact
that in a NOMA system user 2 always has to first decode the
signal transmitted to user 1 (i.e., the weak user with a lower
channel gain) in order to conduct SIC, which leads to the fact
that the information-theoretic PLS of the signal transmitted
to user 1 cannot be achieved (i.e., user 2 may release the
information transmitted to user 1).
B. SNRs in the NOMA System
Based on downlink NOMA scheme, user 1 decodes its
own signal s1 by treating s2 as interference, while user 2
first decodes user 1’s information (i.e., s1) and applies SIC
to decode its own information s2. Thus, the received signal-
to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) for s1 at user 1 and
signal-to-noise (SNR) for s2 at user 2 can be expressed as γ1 =
φ1P |h1|
2
φ2P |h1|2+σ21
= φ1ρ1|h1|
2
φ2ρ1|h1|2+1
, and γ2 =
φ2P |h2|
2
σ22
= φ2ρ2|h2|2,
respectively, where ρ1 =
P
σ21
and ρ2 =
P
σ22
.
Considering that h1 and h2 are known at the transmitter in
the considered NOMA system, the codeword rates for s1 and
s2 are chosen such that R1 =C1 and R2 =C2, respectively,
where C1=log2(1+γ1) and C2=log2(1+γ2). As such, Eve
can decode s1 and then cancel the interference caused by s1
only when Eve’s channel quality is no lower than that of user
1. Therefore, there are two cases with regard to Eve’s ability to
decode s2. When ρe|he|2<ρ1|h1|2 (i.e., when Eve’s channel
quality is lower than that of user 1), Eve cannot decode s1 and
thus decodes s2 directly by treating s1 as interference. In this
case, the SINR of s2 at Eve is given by γe1 =
φ2P |he|
2
φ1P |he|2+σ2e
=
φ2ρe|he|
2
φ1ρe|he|2+1
with ρe =
P
σ2e
. When ρe|he|2 ≥ ρ1|h1|2, Eve can
first decode s1 to in order to cancel the interference caused by
s1 with SIC and then decode s2. Then, in this case the SNR of
s2 at Eve is given by γe2=
φ2P |he|
2
σ2e
=φ2ρe|he|2. Considering
Rayleigh fading, the cumulative distribution functions (cdfs)
of γe1 and γe2 are obtained as
Fγe1(γ) =
{
1− e− γρe(φ2−φ1γ) , γ ≤ φ2φ1 ,
1, γ > φ2φ1 ,
(1)
Fγe2(γ) = 1− e−
γ
φ2ρe . (2)
III. PHYSICAL LAYER SECURITY OF THE STRONG USER
In this section, we aim to maximize the secrecy rate
subjective to a maximum allowable SOP for user 2 while
guaranteeing a requirement on the transmission rate to user
1. The exactly and asymptotically optimal power allocation
coefficients φk and the redundancy rate are determined, based
on which the associated maximum secrecy rate is determined.
A. Transmission Scheme and the Optimization Problem
In order to achieve PLS for user 2, in addition to R2, a
redundancy rate RE for transmitting s2 should be determined
[13]. Then, the instantaneous secrecy rate for user 2 as a
function of φ2 and RE is given by
Rs2(φ2, RE)=[C2 −RE ]+ = [log2(1+φ2ρ˜2)−RE ]+, (3)
where ρ˜2 = ρ2|h2|2 and [x]+ = max(x, 0). However, a
secrecy outage occurs when CE > RE , where CE = log2(1+
γe), γe ∈ {γe1, γe2} is the unknown channel capacity of Eve.
We derive the SOP in the following lemma.
Lemma 1: For our considered NOMA communication sce-
nario, the SOP of s2 is given by
Pout(RE , φ2)=
(1−e−ρ1|h1|
2
ρe )Pout,1(RE , φ2) + e
−
ρ1|h1|
2
ρe Pout,2(RE , φ2),
(4)
where Pout,1(RE , φ2) = e
− 2
RE−1
ρe(φ2−φ1(2
RE−1)) when 2RE −
1 < φ2φ1 , Pout,1(RE , φ2) = 0 when 2
RE − 1 ≥ φ2φ1 , and
Pout,2(RE , φ2) = e
− 2
RE−1
ρeφ2 .
Proof: Based on the analysis in Section II-B, the SOP of
s2 can be given by
Pout(RE , φ2)=Pr(ρe|he|2<ρ1|h1|2)Pout,1(RE , φ2)
+Pr(ρe|he|2≥ρ1|h1|2)Pout,2(RE , φ2), (5)
where Pout,1(RE , φ2) = Pr(γe1 ≥ 2RE − 1) and
Pout,2(RE , φ2) = Pr(γe2 ≥ 2RE − 1). Considering Rayleigh
fading for he, we have Pr(ρe|he|2<ρ1|h1|2)=1− e−
ρ1|h1|
2
ρe
and Pr(ρe|he|2>ρ1|h1|2)= e−
ρ1|h1|
2
ρe . Then, substituting (1)
and (2) into (5), we obtain (4), which proves Lemma 1.
Remark 1: Following Lemma 1, we note that there is a
minimum value for the SOP in order to guarantee a positive
secrecy rate, since he is unknown and the maximum value
of RE is C2 to ensure a positive secrecy rate as per (3).
We note that this minimum value of the SOP exists in both
the NOMA and OMA systems. In the NOMA system, this
minimum value is εn=e
−
σ2e|h1|
2
σ2
1 e
−
σ2e|h2|
2
σ2
2 , which is achieved
by substituting RE =C2 into (4) and noting Pout,1(RE , φ2)
can be enforced to zero by varying φ2. In the OMA system,
this minimum value is εo=e
−
σ2e|h2|
2
σ2
2 , since in the OMA system
Eve does not have interference for decoding s2. We note that
εn<εo due to e
−
σ2e|h1|
2
σ2
1 <1, which is one explicit benefit of
NOMA for secure transmission. Specifically, for εn≤ε<εo,
where ε is the maximum allowable SOP for user 2 in the
considered system, NOMA can achieve a positive secrecy rate,
while OMA cannot. In this work we assume εn≤ε in order
to guarantee the feasibility of the considered optimization
problem and in the comparison between NOMA and OMA
we consider εo≤ε.
In this work, we optimize the power allocation coefficients
(i.e., φ1 and φ2) and the redundancy rate RE to maximize
the instantaneous secrecy rate Rs2(φ2, RE) subject to the
maximum allowable SOP ε for user 2 and a minimum data
rate Q1 for user 1. Then, the optimization problem at the
transmitter is given by
P1 : max
RE ,φ1,φ2
Rs2(φ2, RE) (6)
s.t. C1 ≥ Q1, (7)
Pout(RE , φ2) ≤ ε, (8)
φ1 + φ2 = 1. (9)
3Lemma 2: For any given φ1 or φ2, there is a unique RE
that maximizes Rs2(φ2, RE) subject to Pout(RE , φ2) ≤ ε and
this value is R†E(φ2) that guarantees Pout(RE , φ2) = ε.
Proof: Following (3), we note that Rs2(φ2, RE) mono-
tonically decreases with RE , while Pout(RE , φ2) is a non-
increasing function of RE as per (4). This proves Lemma 2.
B. Exact Solution to the Optimization Problem P1
Theorem 1: The feasible condition of P1 is P >
max(2
Q1−1
|h1|2
σ21 , Pmin), under which the optimal power allo-
cation coefficients and redundancy rate are derived as
φ∗2=min
(
1
2Q1
+
σ21
P |h1|22Q1 −
σ21
P |h1|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ†2
, φ‡2
)
, (10)
φ∗1 = 1− φ∗2, (11)
R∗E = R
†
E(φ
∗
2), (12)
where φ‡2 is the value of φ2 that maximizes log2(1 +
φ2ρ2|h2|2)−R†E(φ2).
Proof: Following the expression of γ1, C1 is maximized
when φ1 → 1 and φ2 → 0. In order to guarantee the constraint
(7), we have to ensure ρ1 ≥ 2Q1−1|h1|2 , which leads to P ≥
2Q1−1
|h1|2
σ21 . As per Lemma 2, we have Pout(RE , φ2) = ε in the
solution to P1, which leads to RE = R
†
E(φ2). Substituting this
value of RE into (3), we have R
s
2(φ2) = log2(1+φ2ρ2|h2|2)−
R†E(φ2). In order to guarantee R
s
2(φ2)>0, we have to ensure
φ2ρ2|h2|2 > 2R†E(φ2)−1, which requires that Pmin satisfies
φ2ρ2|h2|2>2Q(φ2)−1 with the constraint of φ1+φ2=1. Under
this feasible condition, the optimal φ2 that maximizes R
s
2(φ2)
without the constraint C1 ≥ Q1 can be obtained through
φ‡2=argmax
φ2
Rs2(φ2)=argmax
φ2
(log2(1+φ2ρ2|h2|2)−R†E(φ2)).
By setting C1=Q1 in (7), we have φ2=
ρ1|h1|
2−2Q1+1
ρ1|h1|22Q1
. Due to
φ1+φ2=1, C1 is a monotonically decreasing function of φ2
and thus in order to guarantee C1 ≥ Q1 we have the desired
result in (10), based on which (11) and (12) are achieved as
per φ1+φ2=1 and Lemma 2, respectively.
Remark 2: Comparing εn ≤ ε < 1 in Theorem 1 with
ε=1 (i.e., the optimization problem in (6) without security
constraint in (8)), we note that the considered PLS is not
only at the cost of a positive redundancy rate R∗E , but also
a possible reduction in φ∗2, since this φ
∗
2 is no larger than that
in case without considering security. Meanwhile, as per (10) in
Theorem 1, we note that φ†2 decreases with Q1. This indicates
that, as Q1 increases, the power allocation will be more likely
determined by C1≥Q1 and not sensitive to the required secrecy
levels (i.e., the values of ε). We also note that when φ∗2=φ
†
2
the cost of PLS in terms of R∗E decreases with Q1. Intuitively,
this is due to the fact that the power allocated to user 1 also
causes interference at Eve.
C. Asymptotic Solution to the Optimization Problem P1
In order to provide useful insights on the secrecy per-
formance of our considered communication system, in this
subsection we focus on the secrecy rate Rs2(φ2, RE) with a
high MER (i.e., ρ1/ρe = σ
2
e/σ
2
1 →∞) [6].
Lemma 3: With ρ1/ρe →∞, the asymptotic SOP of s2 is
derived as
P∞out(RE , φ2)=

 e
− 2
RE−1
ρe(φ2−φ1(2RE−1)) , 2RE−1< φ2φ1 ,
0, 2RE−1≥ φ2φ1 .
(13)
Proof: Following (4), we have limρ1/ρe→∞ e
−
ρ1|h1|
2
ρe =0.
As such, we conclude that the asymptotic SOP of s2 is equal
to Pout,1(RE , φ2) when
ρ1
ρe
→∞. This completes the proof.
Theorem 2: For ρ1/ρe → ∞ with ε > 0, P >
max
(
2Q1−1
|h1|2
σ21 ,
σ22
|h2|2
− σ2e
ln( 1
ε
)
)
is the feasible condition of P1,
under which the optimal power allocation coefficients and
redundancy rate are derived as
φ∗2=
min
(
1
2Q1
+
σ21
P |h1|22Q1 −
σ21
P |h1|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ†2
,
1
2
+
σ2e
2P ln(1ε )
− σ
2
2
2P |h2|2︸ ︷︷ ︸
φ‡2
)
,
(14)
φ∗1 = 1− φ∗2, (15)
R∗E = log2
(
1 +
φ∗2P ln(
1
ε )
σ2e + φ
∗
1P ln(
1
ε )
)
. (16)
Proof: Similar to the proof of Theorem 1, in order to
guarantee C1 ≥ Q1 we have P ≥ 2Q1−1|h1|2 σ21 . As per Lemma 1,
we have P∞out(RE , φ2) = ε in the solution to P1, which leads
to RE = log2
(
1 +
φ2ρe ln(
1
ε
)
1+(1−φ2)ρe ln(
1
ε
)
)
based on (4) for ε > 0.
Substituting this value of RE into (3), we have R
s
2(φ2) =
log2(1 + φ2ρ2|h2|2) − log2(1 + φ2ρe ln(
1
ε
)
1+(1−φ2)ρe ln(
1
ε
)
). In order
to guarantee Rs2(φ2) > 0, we have to ensure φ2ρ2|h2|2 >
φ2ρe ln(
1
ε
)
1+(1−φ2)ρe ln(
1
ε
)
, which at least requires
ρ2|h2|2 >
ρe ln(
1
ε )
1 + ρe ln(
1
ε )
, (17)
since
ρe ln(
1
ε
)
1+(1−φ2)ρe ln(
1
ε
)
is minimized when φ2 → 0.
We note that (17) leads to P >
σ2e
ln( 1
ε
)
(
σ22 ln(
1
ε
)
σ2e |h2|
2 − 1
)
.
As such, the feasible condition of P1 is P >
max
(
2Q1−1
|h1|2
σ21 ,
σ2e
ln( 1
ε
)
(
σ22 ln(
1
ε
)
σ2e|h2|
2 − 1
))
. Under this feasible
condition, the first and second derivatives of Rs2(φ2) with
respect to φ2 are derived as
∂Rs2(φ2)
∂φ2
=
1
ln 2
(
ρ2|h2|2
1+φ2ρ2|h2|2−
ρe ln(
1
ε )
1+(1−φ2)ρe ln(1ε )
)
,
(18)
∂2Rs2(φ2)
∂φ22
=
1
ln 2
( −ρ22|h2|4
(1+φ2ρ2|h2|2)2−
(ρe ln(
1
ε ))
2
(1+(1−φ2)ρe ln(1ε ))2
)
.
(19)
Following (19), we have ∂2Rs2(φ2)/∂φ
2
2 < 0 by noting 0 <
ε < 1, which indicates that Rs2(φ2) is a concave function of
φ2. As such, as per (18) by setting ∂R
s
2(φ2)/∂φ2 = 0 we
achieve φ2 =
ρ2|h2|
2(1+ρe ln(
1
ε
))−ρe ln(
1
ε
)
2ρ2|h2|2ρe ln(
1
ε
)
. By setting C1 = Q1
in (7), we have φ2 =
ρ1|h1|
2−2Q1+1
ρ1|h1|22Q1
. Due to φ1 + φ2 = 1,
C1 is a monotonically decreasing function of φ2 in order to
4guarantee C1 ≥ Q1. We can obtain the desired result in (14),
based on which (15) and (16) are obtained.
Remark 3: Based on (14) in Theorem 2, we note that as
P →∞ we have φ†2 → 12Q1 and φ
‡
2 → 12 . This indicates that
in the limit of P →∞ we have φ∗2 = 12Q1 when Q1 > 1 and
φ∗2 =
1
2 when Q1 ≤ 1. As per (16) in Theorem 2, we note that
as P →∞ we have R∗E → log2
(
1 +
φ∗2
φ∗1
)
. Therefore, we can
conclude that in the limit of P → ∞ equal power allocation
is optimal and R∗E = log2(2) when Q1 ≤ 1, and the power
allocation is solely determined by the required transmission
rate to user 1 while R∗E decreases with Q1 when Q1 > 1. In
addition, we can see that in the limit of P → ∞ the power
allocation and the cost of PLS are regardless of ε. Furthermore,
we note that for ε → 0 we have φ∗2 < 1/2 regardless of P ,
due to φ‡2 < 1/2 in Theorem 2 and thus R
∗
E ≤ log2(2). This
indicates that for a strict secrecy requirement, the transmitter
will not allocate more power to user 2 relative to user 1.
IV. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In Fig. 1 (a), we plot the maximum secrecy rate for user
2 achieved by our exact and asymptotic solutions to P1. In
Fig. 1 (b) and Fig. 1 (c), we plot φ∗2 and R
∗
E versus the
transmit power P , respectively. In Fig. 1 (a), we first observe
that the asymptotic results approach to the exact results in
the high MER regime, which verifies the correctness of our
analysis. In Fig. 1 (a), we also observe that R∗2 for ε < 1 is
lower than that for ε = 1 (without considering security), where
the performance reduction is the cost of considered PLS. In
Fig. 1 (b), we observe that φ∗2 for either ε = 0.01 or ε = 0.001
is lower than that for ε = 1, which shows one specific cost of
the considered PLS that less power will be allocated to user
2. As expected from Remark 3, φ∗2 for either ε = 0.01 or
0.001 approaches 1/2 as P → ∞ when Q1 is small, which
demonstrates the optimality of the equal power allocation in
the limit of P → ∞ with a small Q1. In Fig. 1 (c), we
observe that R∗E increases with P and R
∗
E → 1 as P → ∞,
which can be explained by our theorems and Remark 3. In
Fig. 1 (d), we plot the maximum secrecy rate achieved by the
NOMA and OMA schemes versusQ1. Here, the OMA scheme
refers to the conventional TDMA scheme, in which half of the
transmission time is allocated to user 1 and the other half is
allocated to user 2. In this figure, we first observe that the
maximum secrecy rate R∗2 achieved by the NOMA scheme
is significantly higher than that achieved by the OMA scheme
under the specific system settings. In addition, we observe that
the NOMA scheme can still achieve a positive secrecy rate
when the OMA scheme cannot (i.e., when 0.8 ≤ Q1 ≤ 1).
This is due to the fact that the transmission time to user 1 in
the OMA scheme is only half of that in the NOMA scheme
and thus it may require a higher transmit power to user 1 in
the OMA scheme.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work, we determined the optimal power allocation
and redundancy rate in order to maximize the secrecy rate for
the strong user subject to a maximum allowable SOP, while
guaranteeing the non-secure transmission rate requirement
to the weak user. The security of the weak user was not
considered, since the signal dedicated to the weak user should
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Fig. 1. (a) Maximum secrecy rate versus MER, (b) φ∗
2
versus P , (c) R∗
E
versus P , and (d) Maximum secrecy rate versus Q1, where Q1 = 0.4 for
(a) and (c), P = 4dB for (d), σ2
1
= σ2
2
= −5dB and σ2e = 2dB for (b)-(d),
|h1|2 = 0.5, |h2|2 = 4 for (a)-(d).
be decoded by the strong user for SIC in NOMA. Our analysis
explicitly revealed the cost of the considered PLS in terms of
the reduction in the secrecy rate to the strong user, which as
shown decreases as the requirement on the transmission rate
to the weak user increases.
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